The article addresses the ontological presuppositions of the discourse on world politics in political and international relations theory. We argue that the ambivalent status of world politics is due to the understanding of its central concept, i.e. the world, in terms of totality or 'the whole'. Drawing on Alain Badiou's set-theoretical ontology, the article demonstrates that such a concept is logically inconsistent, which leads the discourse on world politics to a perpetual oscillation between the presupposition of a universal totality and the unmasking of its impossibility. We then proceed to the particularistic concept of the world as a limited totality with no pretense to universality, as developed in Heidegger's phenomenological ontology and Badiou's objective phenomenology. While this approach that affirms the existence of the infinity of infinite worlds appears of little use to the universalist problematic of world politics, it provides us with a pathway to the third concept of the world as the void, in which a plurality of positive worlds coexist and which is their ontological condition of possibility. We shall argue that only this concept of the world enables a logically consistent notion of universality as non-totalizable and immediate. The final section addresses the implications of this concept for rethinking world politics as a practice of transformation of particular worlds in accordance with the universal principles derived from the disclosure of the world as void. 
a hegemonic pretension (cf. Walker, 2009: 20-28 For Bartelson, the problematic status of the concept of the world community in the disciplinary discourse has to do with the differential logic of identity that has been constitutive of the discipline (Bartelson, 2009: 9-10) . According to this logic, every identity is constituted by distinction from an 'other'. Since a world community would lack such an other by definition, it is henceforth impossible other than as a hegemonic imposture that claims for itself the universality it can never attain (cf. Abizadeh, 2005; Prozorov, 2011) . In his historical analysis Bartelson demonstrates that this logic of identity is a relatively recent invention and can therefore be overcome by a return to an earlier understanding of world community as a wider cosmological context, in which a plurality of human communities are always already embedded. This emphasis on embeddedness directs Bartelson's attention to the cosmological visions, within which the ideas of world politics and world community have been articulated since the Middle Ages. These visions escape the differential logic of identity by 'positing a larger social whole within which all human communities are embedded and well as a vantage point over and above the plurality of individual communities from which this larger social whole can be understood ' (ibid.: 20) . Thus, it is possible to 'restore the default settings of political thought ' (ibid.: 175) and reaffirm the world community no longer as an obscure telos of international politics, but as its very condition of possibility, something that is already here in the form of the presupposition, as long as human beings inhabit the same planet and share a common destiny. Yet, this reaffirmation 'depends on its coherence and persuasiveness on the existence of a cosmological vantage point situated over and above 3 the plurality of human communities and the multitude of individual human beings. ' (Ibid.: 181) In contrast to Bartelson's optimistic vision, R.B.J. Walker's After the Globe, Before the World exemplifies the tendency to render the universalist claims of world politics problematic. Walker addresses the ways in which numerous attempts to move from international relations to world politics remain caught up in what they try to transcend, i.e. the ontopolitical tradition of modernity, which is itself already an attempt at resolving the antinomies that we associate with world politics (e.g. universalism/particularism, nature/culture, individual/community, etc.) (Walker, 2009: 54-94) . The 'seduction' and 'temptation' of world politics belong to the very tradition of the 'international' as its inherent transgression, something simultaneously desired and held impossible (ibid.: 24, 83).
Wherever we are, we are always 'before' the world, facing it as distant and inappropriable.
Universalist claims are always '[enabled] within a particular array of boundaries, borders and limits' and a 'politics of the world' that promises to do away with those remains 'necessarily beyond reach'. (ibid.: 257-258) Thus, 'anyone seeking to reimagine the possibilities of political life under contemporary conditions would be wise to resist ambitions expressed as a move from a politics of the international to a politics of the world, and to pay far greater attention to what goes on at the boundaries, borders and limits of a politics orchestrated within the international.' (Ibid.: 2-3, see also 184-257) While there are numerous possibilities for political experimentation at these liminal sites, we would do well to remember that this experimentation always takes place on this side of the borderline.
Thus, while Bartelson seeks to 'deproblematize' the question of world community, trying to rid it of logical paradoxes by enfolding the problematic of community into an explicitly cosmological context and thus making the world the a priori site of any community 4 whatsoever, Walker hypertrophies this question, making it practically impossible to exit the condition of the international at all.
It is easy to see that this perpetual debate cannot be restricted to the domain of 'IR theory proper', since it pertains to the ontological presuppositions that condition the very distinction between the domestic and the international, and hence between political and IR theory. 1 Indeed, both Bartelson and Walker explicitly locate the question of world politics on the level of ontology, the universalist social ontology that precedes any possible 'nationalization' of community for Bartelson and the paradoxical yet resilient ontology grounding the international order for Walker. Since the argument of this article also remains on the ontological terrain, it is important to clearly define the concept of ontology that we shall rely on, all the more so because this concept is often deployed in diverse and somewhat confusing ways in political and IR theory. As Bruno Bosteels (2011: 241-242) has argued, the original Aristotelian sense of ontology as 'first philosophy', a science of being qua being frequently gives way to a rather more loose understanding of ontology in terms of 'the basic presuppositions behind a given politico-philosophical stance, the bedrock of fundamental assumptions and unshakable commitments', which might be better described as 'political anthropology' or even 'ideology'.
In order to avoid this reduction of ontology to a worldview, IR theorists have relied on the distinction between philosophical and scientific ontology (Patomaki and Wight, 2000: 215, Jackson, 2010: 29-31) . While scientific ontology refers to a 'catalog of objects, processes and factors that a given line of scientific research expects to exist or has evidence for the existence of', philosophical ontology pertains to the question of our 'hook-up to the world, how we as researchers are able to produce knowledge in the first place' (Jackson, 2010: 28) .
While this distinction is helpful for highlighting the relation of substantive debates in IR 5 theory to the fundamentals of philosophy of science (Jackson, 2010: 29-40) , it is clear that neither 'philosophical' nor 'scientific' ontology actually captures the Aristotelian sense of the discourse on 'being qua being' that deals with all that exists but only insofar as it exists.
Evidently, 'scientific ontology' as described by Jackson pertains to individual and particular beings or realms thereof (e.g. states, states' systems or statesmen) and not to being as such. In the terms of the two ontologists that we shall discuss in this article, Martin Heidegger and Alain Badiou, this approach would rather be termed ontical (Heidegger, 1962: 32-35) or phenomenological (Badiou, 2009a: 99-103 ). Yet, 'philosophical ontology' fares little better, insofar as in its investigation of our 'hook-up' to the world it supplants the question of being with the question of the knowledge of some beings by others, thereby slipping into the same ontical terrain, becoming indistinct from what we usually call 'methodology' (cf. Jackson, 2010: 32) . This is not to denigrate either of the enterprises but only to point out that prior to the study of particular worldly beings in their positive predicates and the study of the conditions of our access to these beings there exists a level of inquiry that addresses these objects solely in the aspect of their being, bracketed off from their particular predicates. It is this level, which we may term formal ontology (Hennig 2008) , that the argument of this article occupies.
While such an inquiry may appear excessively abstract, it does not imply a retreat into obscure and empty generality, since being, the object of ontology, is simultaneously the most universal and the most singular of all notions, accessible to us in the utmost facticity of our existence. 'Being is most universal, encountered in every being, and is therefore most common; it has lost every distinction, or never possessed any. At the same time, being is the most singular, whose uniqueness cannot be attained by any being whatever.' (Heidegger, 1991: 192) As we shall argue below, it is precisely this 'singular universality' of being that conditions the possibility of a consistent concept of world politics.
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In this article we shall draw on the insights from the phenomenological ontology of Martin Heidegger and the set-theoretical ontology of Alain Badiou in the discussion of three possible concepts of the world: the whole of beings (the world as 'everything'), a limited totality of beings (the world as 'something') and the void of being (the world as 'nothing'). We shall demonstrate that while the first concept is logically inconsistent and the second one inconsequential for the discourse on world politics, the third concept alone grounds a consistent form of universalism that rids the theory of world politics of its constitutive ambivalence. In the final section we shall address the possibility of a politics adequate to this universality. While the detailed analysis of this politics remains beyond the scope of this article, we merely seek to demonstrate the possibility of a universalist politics whose maxims are derived from our exposure to the world as void.
The World as Everything
Despite their diverging conclusions about the possibility of a world community, Bartelson and Walker converge in the basic assumption about the meaning of the 'world' in world politics. Bartelson's world, which is already 'behind' us as an all-encompassing whole, within which we are embedded, and Walker's world, which stands 'before' us as an unattainable universality, are one and the same world, understood in the sense of the Whole, a cosmos, universe or totality, in short, everything. This understanding of the world as the whole has arguably been at work in IR theory since its very emergence (see e.g. Morgenthau, 1948, chapters 29, 30; Carr, 1981; Schmitt, 1976; Burton, 1972; Boulding, 1985) , and seems so perfectly in accordance with common sense and everyday language that it is difficult to see what could possibly be wrong with it.
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Let us posit the world as the whole, the sum of all beings. Such a totality must by definition count itself among its members, otherwise it would not be the sum of all beings, since it would remain outside itself. The world as the whole is thus endowed with a property of selfbelonging. It should therefore be possible to divide it into two parts: the parts of the world that belong to themselves, such as the world itself, and the parts that do not, such as e.g. a set of five apples which is not itself an apple. Let us then assemble the latter parts into a group of all parts that do not belong to themselves -a perfectly legitimate and even banal grouping,
given that most multiplicities that we can think of are precisely not self-belonging. Yet, despite the banality of the predicate, this grouping turns out to be problematic as soon as we pose the question of whether it belongs to itself. If it does, it counts itself among its elements, which are defined by the property of not belonging to themselves. Yet, if it does not belong to itself, it must also count itself among its elements, which, after all, compose all the parts that do not belong to themselves. Whatever answer we choose, we end up with inconsistency, hence we must revise our original assumption and affirm that the world as the sum of all beings does not exist.
It is easy to recognize in this example the famous Russell's paradox which has been foundational for the formulation of axiomatic set theory in the early 20 th century. Yet, is settheoretical logic relevant to the grand debates on world politics? In fact, as long as we conceive of ontology in the Aristotelian sense as the study of being qua being, set theory offers the best paradigm of such a discourse. In Alain Badiou's famous argument, set theory is ontology pure and simple, since its object is not any particular class of beings defined by some positive predicates but rather everything that is insofar as it is: being as such is nothing but pure multiplicity that can be adequately grasped by set-theoretical axioms precisely insofar as they subtract being from the positive properties of beings (Badiou, 2005: 4-16 Evidently, the argument that set theory is ontology does not mean that being is 'composed of mathematical objectivities' but only asserts that set theory 'pronounces what is expressible of being qua being' and is therefore the most adequate form of ontological discourse (ibid.: 8).
From this perspective, the axioms of set theory necessarily pertain to everything that is, including the entities of the international domain and the world as the result of their totalization. To exclude these entities (be they states or persons, organizations or movements, etc.) from the field of application of set-theoretical axioms is simply to deprive them of being and reduce them to the status of simulacra, phenomenal apparitions without any ontological status. In short, as soon as we pose the problem of the world in ontological terms, the settheoretical argument on the inexistence of the whole appears not merely applicable to the discourse on world politics but of direct and paramount relevance to it.
We shall therefore conclude that concept of the world, understood in terms of cosmos, universe or totality, is inconsistent: the Whole has no being (Badiou, 2005: 40-42; 2009a: 109-111). We must emphasize that this claim does not merely concern the antiquated preGalilean conceptions of the closed totality of the cosmic order, whose crisis was addressed by Alexandre Koyre (1957) in his seminal work From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe.
In fact, it is precisely because the world is infinite that it cannot be totalized into any figure of the whole, without violating Georg Cantor's theorem, foundational for set theory (see Badiou, 2005: 142-160, 265-280) . For any set whatsoever, it is possible to construct a set, whose elements are all the subsets of the original set, a so-called 'power-set'. We may easily intuit that this set would be quantitatively greater than the original set: e.g. the number of possible combinations of any three letters a, b and c is eight (a, b, c, ab, bc, ac, abc and finally the void set Ø, which is included as a 'universal part' of any set and which we shall discuss in detail below). Cantor's theorem demonstrates that for infinite sets the size of the power-set is also greater than that of the original set, and, moreover, it is inaccessibly greater: it is possible to posit any infinite cardinal greater than that of the original set as the 'size' of its power-set (ibid.: 277-280).
The consequences of this theorem for any cosmological conception of the world are staggering. As soon as we posit the existence of the world as the whole, it is possible to construct a power-set of this world, which will be immeasurably greater than it, leaving an excess that cannot be incorporated into it. The same procedure can then be applied to this power-set and so on to infinity. There is thus no such thing as 'the absolutely infinite Infinity, the infinity of all intrinsically thinkable infinities' (ibid.: 277. Cf. ibid.: 283-284). The world as the whole is never all there is.
It is important to emphasize that the thesis on the inexistence of the Whole is an ontological
claim about the world that should be rigorously distinguished from a rather more familiar and unobjectionable epistemological claim that our knowledge or representation of the world is never complete, while the world in itself might well be so, the claim that characterizes the post-Kantian position that Quentin Meillassoux termed 'correlationism' (Meillassoux, 2008: 5) . Insofar as we take the axioms of set theory to pertain to the being of all there is, the epistemological failure or incapacity to know the world as a whole is converted into the ontological feature of the world as itself non-whole or non-totalizable (cf. ibid.: 51-53). Thus, contrary to the correlationist skepticism that perpetually refers this non-totalizability back to us as subjects of knowledge, Badiou's thesis on the inexistence of the whole affirms it as the feature of being itself, which, moreover, we may know perfectly well with no reason for any skepticism (Badiou, 2009a: 101-102) .
The World as Something
Having demonstrated that the world cannot be consistently posited as the whole, let us now consider the alternative possibility. The world may be posited as a limited totality with no pretense to universality, a something rather than everything.
Indeed, such a non-cosmological, 'local' concept of the world was dominant in the 20 th century phenomenology, particularly the early work of Martin Heidegger. In Being and Time
Heidegger defined the world as a referential totality of Dasein's 'involvements' with other beings, the environment in which Dasein is absorbed in all kinds of references or assignments that involve various kinds of 'equipment', entities that are 'ready-to-hand' (zuhanden) for one's dealings in the world (Heidegger, 1962: 95-107 disclosed to it, not in an objectified manner of things present-at-hand (vorhanden) but in terms of practical functions that can be assigned to them and for which they available. The paradigm of Heidegger's phenomenology of the world is the workshop, a totality of tools assigned to certain practical functions, in which Dasein is involved (Harman, 2002: 15-48; Malpas, 2006: 182-189) . Thus, the world is always already there for Dasein as the referential totality of its involvements and any discovery of a concrete entity in the world is only possible on the basis of our pre-understanding of the world, in which we dwell. any intentional or 'lived' dimension of the worlds he analyzes, making the existence of worlds entirely independent from human existence (Badiou, 2009a: 118-119 ). This accounts for a different relationship between ontology and phenomenology in Badiou's work. For
Heidegger ontology was itself necessarily phenomenological in its method, since its condition of possibility was Dasein's pre-understanding of being, on whose basis the meaning of being is to be interpreted (Heidegger, 1962: 29-35, 49-63) . In contrast, Badiou posits a rigorous disjunction between them while making both entirely independent of the existential analytic of Dasein (Badiou, 2009a: 118) . While ontology deals with being in the set-theoretical sense of pure or inconsistent multiplicity, the phenomenology of Logics of Worlds focuses on the localization of being as 'being-there', appearance in a determinate and ordered situation. It is this situation, structured as a network of identities and differences, that Badiou terms the world. In more technical terms, the world is defined as a set that contains a transcendental and the transcendental indexing of all its elements (ibid.: 598).
The transcendental refers to the order-structure that assigns the entities in the world various degrees of intensity of appearance. Contrary to the more familiar concept of the transcendental in Kant's philosophy, Badiou's transcendental organization of the world is a strictly immanent process that accounts for the logical cohesion of appearance, which is not determined by the ontological composition of the situation -a key point we shall return to below (ibid.: 101, 121-122, 241-242) . Transcendental indexing is a function that makes a degree of appearance (from the minimum to the maximum) correspond to a pair of elements of the set that appears in the world. On the basis of these operations Badiou builds up an elaborate phenomenology, in which any situation whatsoever, from a protest demonstration to a country house on an autumn evening, can be analyzed as a world, structured by a particular transcendental order.
This conception of the world yields two important consequences. Firstly, on the basis of the principle of the inexistence of the whole, we may conclude that there is always more than one world (ibid.: 114-115). Moreover, since it is impossible to restrict the number of worlds in the absence of the whole, their number may therefore be posited as infinite. Secondly, every one of these worlds is itself infinite. It is impossible to delimit a world either from below through the dissemination of its elements or from above through their totalization (ibid.: 306-310, 331-335).
Thus, we have moved from the assumption of one world as the Whole to the infinity of worlds that are themselves infinite. Each of those worlds is characterized by a specific transcendental order that can be reconstituted through a Heideggerian or Badiouan phenomenology, but is at the same time part of a wider world and decomposable into smaller worlds that are also liable to phenomenological analysis. While this approach can be fruitfully applied in IR in the study of e.g. the 'worlds' of diplomatic negotiations, border policing or refugee camps, it is apparently of little help in rethinking world politics in its more familiar universalist sense, since world politics here is simply the politics that unfolds within a particular world in accordance with its transcendental order. The very question of political universality appears to be foreclosed by the plurality of worlds with particular orders above or between which no authority exists. Is not world politics then strictly synonymous to international relations and the world simply identical to the international domain that it was intended to transcend? (Walker 2009: 21-22 ) This is indeed the position of the diverse group of the critics of cosmopolitan universalism who affirm the pluralism of the international as the sole possible universal (see e.g. Jackson 2003 , Connolly 1995 , Mouffe 2009 ), whereby the world is nothing but a plurality of worlds and world politics consists in maintaining this plurality against any hegemonic totalization.
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Nonetheless, the universalization of the international as the 'world of all worlds' merely throws us back into logical inconsistency. Just as ontologically every set is a set of sets, so every world is in principle a world of worlds, i.e. it contains other worlds that appear in it (Badiou, 2005: 45; 2009: 112) . It is therefore possible for the international world to contain an infinite multiplicity of worlds -the only thing that this or any other world cannot contain is everything. Thus, as Walker demonstrates admirably, one will never reach world politics if one begins from the international (Walker, 2009: 26-31 ). Yet, while this claim leads Walker to a profound skepticism about world politics as such, the impossibility of passing from the international to the world is only a problem as long as we continue to envision the universality of world politics as necessarily mediated by particularity (cf. Pin-Fat 2009). If the world of the international is a particular world among others and, as Walker argues at length, its particular transcendental is historically contingent, the impossibility of arriving at the universality of world politics from the particularism of the international simply entails the need for another starting point for conceptualizing the universality of world politics. Since presupposing the world as the whole leads us to inconsistency and starting from particular worlds leads us nowhere, this new starting point is obtained by abandoning every totalizing conception of the world and asserting its universality without recourse to any mediation by the particular. It is this solution that we address in the following section.
The World as Nothing
While at first glance the particularistic conception of worlds merely confirms the impasse of the discourse of world politics due to the inaccessibility of the universal, it actually guides us towards a solution to our problem by raising the question of the conditions of appearance of this infinity of worlds. Simply put, where are all these worlds? Just as we commonly speak of From ancient Greek atomism onwards, this problem has been resolved by asserting that whatever exists positively does so in the empty space, vacuum or void, in short -Nothing (see Gregory, 1981; Badiou, 2009b: 56-64) . Indeed, this answer appears to be the last remaining logical possibility: if we have excluded the possibility of the world being everything and we are not satisfied with a particularistic understanding of the world as something, then it can only be nothing. Yet, everything depends on how we understand this 'nothing'. As long as it is understood in the merely negative sense of privation, lack or absence, we remain within the political ontology of the international for which there are only particular worlds and nothing beyond them. However, it is also possible to understand the claim about the nothingness of the world as a pure affirmation: there is a world, in which an infinity of infinite worlds appears, and this World, which we shall henceforth capitalize to distinguish it from worlds as limited totalities, is nothing but the void.
Let us elucidate this concept of the World by revisiting Heidegger's work after Being and Time,
in which there is a gradual shift away from the understanding of the world as a practical context of Dasein's activity towards an ontological concept of the world (cf. Malpas, 2006: 186-189 In relation to the individual trees and the way they are gathered together the forest is something else. It is that out of which the many trees belong to a forest.' (Heidegger, 1995: 347) The World is thus neither a being nor an aggregation of all beings in a particular world but rather the opening, in which particular worlds become disclosed for the first time. This opening is not immediately manifest to the inhabitant of a particular world but can only disclose itself through the awakening of a 'fundamental attunement' or mood (Stimmung). In Yet, what exactly is disclosed here? It is purely and simply nothing, the emptiness arising from beings refusing access to themselves and the void of Dasein's existential possibilities.
'The openness at stake is essentially the openness to a closedness, and whoever looks in the open sees only a closing, only a not-seeing.' (Agamben 2004: 68 . See also Heidegger, 1973: 16 169-180) The opening of the World is nothing more than the result of the subtraction of the human being from its particular world.
The metaphysical problem of the nothing is elaborated in Heidegger's 1929 lecture 'What is
Metaphysics?' In this lecture, Dasein is explicitly defined as 'being held out into the nothing' (Heidegger, 1973: 108) While any serious consideration of the 'Heidegger problem' goes beyond the scope of this article, our reconstruction of the concept of Heidegger's concept of the World as void at least permits us to offer a new perspective on it. Nihilism, to which Nazism was a historical response and of which it was the historical nadir, is not constituted by embracing the ontology of the World as void, but rather by its negation. Nihilism is a disposition that wants to 'know nothing of the nothing', reducing it to a mere 'nullity' (Heidegger, 1977: 96) . In
Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger defined nihilism in terms of 'chasing after beings' in the 'oblivion of being itself', which we may rephrase in terms of the valorization of worlds in the oblivion of the World:
But where is the real nihilism at work? Where one clings to current beings and believes it is enough to take beings, as before, just as the beings that they are.
But with this, one rejects the question of being and treats being as a nothing (nihil), which in a certain way it even "is," insofar as it essentially unfolds.
Merely to chase after beings in the midst of the oblivion of being -that is nihilism. (Heidegger, 1961: 217) If the void of the World is reduced to the neutral nothingness as the background for the appearance of positive worlds, no universality is conceivable, since the infinite plurality of positive orders is all there is. The formula of nihilism may thus be summed up as follows:
'there are only positive worlds and nothing besides them'. Yet, if this is the case, then there is no political principle that could transcend the positive order of the world and in terms of which this order could ever be found illegitimate: everything is permissible if a particular transcendental order permits it. In this manner, Nazism becomes possible as a world, in which the negativity of annihilation paradoxically reigns as the supreme ordering principle.
Yet, it is important to bear in mind that it only becomes possible as a result of the negation of the World as void, its nullification as politically inconsequential and incapable of grounding any universalist politics. While Heidegger admittedly could not resist the temptation of this nullification himself, his thought at least permits us to trace this ontopolitical gesture in Western metaphysics, which is the first step in the direction of its overcoming. The second step in this direction consists in elucidating the relation between the ontology of the World and the phenomenology of worlds, which will make the concept of the World as void politically consequential and thereby redeem its universalist potential. In the following section we shall pursue this question in an analysis of Alain Badiou's ontology. In Logics of Worlds, Badiou departs from the void as the first determinable set. Since in a settheoretical ontology one can only posit a set if one can determine its composition, it is possible to immediately determine a set that has no elements, i.e. the void set Ø. The thinkability of all other sets depends on their belonging to specific worlds. Yet, since the void set has no elements, it logically appears in any world whatsoever:
The World and Worlds
[Since] the void is the only immediate being, it follows that it figures in any world whatsoever. Badiou 2009a: 112-113 ). This does not mean that everything is in fact made of nothing, but merely that in order to be grasped in the aspect of their being, beings must be subtracted from all positive predicates they are endowed with in the particular worlds, just like Dasein is in the mood of profound boredom (Badiou, 2005: 58) . For this reason, ontology is equivalent to a theory of the void and, moreover, can only be a theory of the void, since if it asserted the existence of other beings, it would reduce itself to phenomenology, i.e. the description of the transcendental orders of particular worlds. Ontology must therefore begin and end with the void, all of its terms being derived from the void alone (Badiou 2005, 57) .
[The] absolutely primary theme of ontology is therefore the void -the Greek atomists, Democritus and his successors, clearly understood this -but it is also its final theme because in the last resort, all inconsistency is unpresentable, thus While the World is in every world, it is important to emphasize that there is no necessary relation between the World as void and the positivity of worlds. If one could infer appearance from being, there would only be one positive world whose transcendental order would somehow 'correspond' to the void -that world would have to be the whole and is therefore impossible. It is nonetheless possible to make the opposite move of inferring being from appearance that would establish 'an ontological halting point' (Badiou, 2009a: 195) to the infinite proliferation of intra-worldly appearances. In Badiou's postulate of materialism, 'every atom of appearance is real ' (ibid.: 218-220) , so that whatever appears in the world must have an ontological correlate, a multiplicity composed of the void. The first conclusion to be drawn from the concept of the World as void consists in the affirmation of the contingency of every world, insofar the transcendental order that conditions its appearance has no foundation in being. by analogy with the principle of ex falso quodlibet: anything at all follows from nothing.
Whatever politics is practiced in a particular world, it is 'founded' by the void to an equal degree to any other politics. Either way, no positive political principle may be inferred from the World, which is merely an indifferent vacuum, in which an infinite number of contingent worlds coexist.
If all the ontology of the World as void could politically prescribe were either nothing or anything, we would be stuck in nihilism, either a 'passive nihilism' of a weary particularism resigned to the ways of one's world or an 'active nihilism' of a rampant particularism that arbitrarily posits its own prescriptions (cf. Nietzsche, 1968: 16-18).
Nonetheless, there is a third possibility of a genuinely universal political prescription that follows precisely from the affirmation of contingency. For the contingency of a positive world to become manifest, the World as void must first come to appearance within this world,
i.e. be disclosed to a worldly being. As we have argued, this disclosure of the World takes place in an attunement that Heidegger refers to as 'standing out in the nothing'. This condition is attained when we subtract ourselves from the positive transcendental order of our world, ending up 'left empty' and 'held in limbo' due to the suspension of both our own intra-worldly identities and our relations with other beings of the world. As a result of this subtraction, the transcendental of the world, which is nothing but the relational network that regulates the appearance of beings, is rendered inoperative and, as it were, comes undone.
Yet, this suspension of the transcendental does not entail the disappearance or dissolution of the beings of the world, but only that they now appear solely in their being, as a pure inconsistent multiplicity devoid of positive identity or relational order (Badiou, 2005: 25) .
We shall term this zero degree of appearance 'being-in-the-World', in contrast to Heidegger's positive and relational 'being-in-the-world'. Giorgio Agamben (1993: 1-3, 96) has famously termed this mode of appearance 'whatever being' or 'being-thus': being that is solely its manner of being, subtracted from all identitarian predicates and wholly exposed in its facticity. In other words, in their subtraction from the transcendental of the world 'whatever beings' undergo neither a deprivation (of the old identity) nor a transformation (into a new one), but solely the exposure of the fact that they are in the absence of any identification of what they are.
Thus, the disclosure of the World within positive worlds also transforms the beings to whom it is disclosed, reducing their positive and transcendentally regulated being-in-the-world to the subtractive mode of being-in-the-World, in which all that appears is being itself.
Evidently, if there were to exist a politics of the World that would go beyond the affirmation of the pluralism of worlds but whose maxims would be irreducible to positive intra-worldly principles, this austere condition could be its sole possible foundation. While the World as void cannot be the source of political maxims, they may nonetheless be derived from beingin-the-World as the attunement that we as worldly beings must enter for the World to be disclosed in the first place.
While this derivation is beyond the scope of this article, let us merely illuminate its logic by considering such familiar political principles as freedom, equality and community. These maxims have historically served as positive intra-worldly principles governing particular, e.g.
liberal, socialist or nationalist worlds. Moreover, all three of them have been deployed tendentiously and hypocritically in hegemonic and often violent attempts to universalize these particular worlds. There is certainly no shortage of critical studies exposing the way the alleged universality of these principles was used to legitimize particularistic, inegalitarian and exclusionary forms of politics. And yet, the concepts of freedom, equality and community have also been reinterpreted in contemporary continental thought on the basis of the affirmation of pure being devoid of any positive identitarian predicates (see respectively Nancy 1994 , Ranciere 1999 , Agamben 1993 .
Grasped as the attributes of being-in-the-World, freedom, equality and community are no longer reducible to ideologies, values or norms of a particular origin, Western or otherwise, but rather describe the condition attained by the withdrawal from any intra-worldly norm.
The mode of their functioning is thus strictly axiomatic, devoid of any intra-worldly 26 foundation and referring to that which remains when worldly beings are subtracted from all such foundations and are exposed in the pure facticity of their being. From this perspective, these axioms are simultaneously transcendent and immanent in relation to the worlds in which they are affirmed. Insofar as they are derived from the subtraction from every intraworldly determination, they are by definition transcendent in relation to all worlds. Yet, since the void of the World is the universal part of every world, these axioms are also immanent to every world in which they are advanced. In Jean-Luc Nancy's formulation, they are transimmanent, transcending the positivity of the world not from above or beyond but from within (Nancy, 1998: 55) .
It is thus possible to conceive of the politics of the World that goes beyond the mere affirmation of the contingency of all worlds towards the transformation of these worlds on the basis of the axioms arising from being-in-the-World as the condition, in which the void of the World is disclosed. This transformation consists in the production within worlds of the positive effects of these axioms, i.e. the overcoming and neutralization of intra-worldly hierarchies, exclusions and restrictions that have no ontological correlate in the name of freedom, equality and community of all beings as whatever beings. 3 Thus, the axioms of being-in-the-World give concrete content to a universalist world politics that is no longer suspended between passive and active nihilism, between 'nothing works' and 'anything goes' but rather strives to enhance freedom, equality and community in an infinity of infinite worlds where it is practiced.
While these axioms are valid for all worlds, the task of world politics does not consist in the aggregation of the infinity of worlds into an 'over-world' constituted on their basis. However 'global' in its scope, such an overworld could never contain all worlds and would thus remain a particular world among others, devoid of any ontological privilege over more 'local' 27 worlds. Yet, neither can such a privilege be granted to the plurality of local worlds, since the contingency of worlds does not depend on their size or any other immanent characteristic.
Thus, integration and fragmentation are equally legitimate pathways for world politics, which has no privileged site, level or method but is defined solely by its content, the universal axioms derived from being-in-the-World. World politics does not derive its name from the fact that it unites all worlds into the whole but from the fact that it affirms the same axioms arising from the disclosure of the void of the World in whatever world it is practiced.
28 NOTES
